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Abstract 
French hardware manufacturers were by and large incapable not only of translating 
technological advances into industrial products but even of understanding the new 
opportunities these advances offered. While true up to a point, this approach, focused on the 
failure of the so-called ''national champion'' policy, is incapable of explaining why French 
providers of IT services have had considerable success both in their own domestic market and 
in the wider European market. The argument advanced is that a very active higher education 
policy and national research strategy has produced a supply of particularly valuable 
competences which feed the IT sector. In addition, the previous mission-oriented policies 
encouraged the development of effective technological districts which now nurture the 
appearance of a plethora of small, innovative IT firms.  
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The history of the computer industry is usually divided into four main periods. The 
first was dominated by mainframe computers that were capable of undertaking large-scale 
computation tasks. The second saw the introduction of integrated circuits and the development 
of minicomputers.  The third was characterised by the development of the personal computer, 
a phenomenon made possible by the invention of the microprocessor. We are now in the age 
of PC networks and the expansion of the “network of networks”, the Internet.   
Each new technological age has witnessed the emergence of new firms that have 
shaken the leading companies of the previous period without dislodging them from the 
markets in which they were previously positioned or preventing them from entering new 
markets (Malerba and al., 1998). The first of these leading companies was IBM. As an 
integrated producer of computer systems, “Big Blue” long played a dominant role and was 
instrumental in globalising the computer industry. The next in line was DEC, with 
minicomputers, followed by Apple, Commodore and Compaq as PC specialists and, above all, 
the beneficiaries of the “vertical disintegration” of the industry, chief among them Intel and 
Microsoft. “ Wintelism ” (Borus, Zysman 1997) led to the decline of “proprietary systems” 
and placed designers of  “operating systems” and microprocessors in a key position, to the 
detriment of computer manufacturers, “Big Blue” notably, but Compaq and Toshiba as well.   
This shift in market power became even more pronounced with the diffusion of the 
Internet.  The new beneficiaries were the producers of applications (SAP, Adobe), of 
interfaces (Netscape) and of languages (Sun) and “pure product definition companies”, such 
as Cisco and 3COM. The result was a move away from proprietary systems towards open 
systems, which ensured compatibility between the standards of the various suppliers whose 
products and services provide the foundations on which the networks depend. Control of these 
standards and of the associated intellectual property rights are essential resources for those 
seeking to obtain competitive advantages in these new markets in the IT industry.  
These characteristics, briefly summarised here, have already been described at length 
by many analysts of the changes that have affected technological paradigms in the IT industry 
(Mowery and Rosenberg, 1998). However, this history of the industry is obviously to a large 
extent that of the American IT industry, since the pre-eminence of the American companies 
went unchallenged, with just a few exceptions.  Japan was successful for a time in resisting 
IBM’s domination by adopting the same type of mission-oriented policies as those developed 
in Europe, but even the Japanese finished by capitulating in the face of “Wintelism”. 
Moreover, the brief historical survey presented here runs the risk of making this 
account of IT history seem a “natural” one, the mere result of technological progress alone. In 
fact, this American pre-eminence induces us to examine the institutions and modes of 
industrial organisation that fostered this particular form of path dependency à l’américaine, in 
which success followed success in an uninterrupted sequence.    
This acknowledgement, commonplace and trivial in itself, of the wide gap that exists 
between the European IT industry, particularly the French one, and its American counterpart 
leads us to combine this sectoral analysis with the national innovation systems approach (NIS) 
as developed, for example, by Freeman (1987). Freeman defines a NIS as a network of 
institutions operating in the public and private sectors whose activities and interactions 
introduce, modify and diffuse the new technologies. This approach stresses the specificity of 
the choices that shape the various national systems, in particular through public policies on 
education, academic research, legislation on patents and intellectual property and access to 
finance for emerging technologies.  
The result is a certain dynamic irreversibility contained within “particular institutional 
infrastructures” (Dosi and al. 1988, Nelson, 1993, Edquist 1997). Firms draw on the 
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institutional resources of their countries of origin in order to construct their competitiveness 
and, more generally, to operate effectively in globalised markets. The interaction between 
firms and these institutions gives them access to more or less effective organisational and 
technological learning processes through which national industries acquire their particular 
configuration (Lundvall 1992). 
From our point of view, the case of the French IT industry provides an emblematic 
case of the “embeddedness” of technological and industrial development in national 
innovation systems.  This article will attempt to explain why, at the various stages in the 
development of the IT industry, French hardware manufacturers were by and large incapable, 
despite certain flashes of inventiveness, not only of translating technological advances into 
industrial products but even of understanding the new opportunities those advances offered.  
We will focus in particular on the effects of the so-called “national champion” policy that was 
embodied in the Bull company and its various earlier incarnations. Over a long period, the 
French state maintained a policy that was commercially very protective and financially 
advantageous; it involved the payment of subsidies on such a scale that it became very 
difficult for new firms to enter the market. In the United States, on the other hand, the 
emergence of new competitors had long been strongly encouraged by access to venture 
capital; the success of this procedure was such that it became the cornerstone of current 
European technological policies. 
Nevertheless, this interpretation is still too restrictive and the comparison with the 
American case is of limited heuristic value. Indeed, they both fail to take account of the 
positive consequences produced over the long term by sustained mission-oriented policies.  In 
fact, these policies encouraged the development of technological districts, in Paris and in 
various other regions, which today, in the age of open systems, provide significant resources 
for the French industry as it seeks to position itself more favourably at a time when 
telecommunications and computing are converging.  
What is more, an approach that focuses on policy failures is incapable of explaining 
why French providers of IT services have had considerable success in both their own domestic 
market and the wider European market.  The argument advanced here is that a very active 
education policy, particularly at the higher education level, has produced a supply of 
particularly valuable competences.  It has to be acknowledged, nevertheless, that the hardware 
industry also had these same resources at its disposal.  However, it should be noted that the 
software houses were able to exploit the competitive advantage of proximity between clients 
and suppliers (co-production of services in the sense that Lundvall (1988) uses the term), 
whereas Bull was scarcely in a position to do so any longer as soon as international standards 
were established that overturned the positions the company had acquired on the basis of its 
proprietary systems.  Moreover, the software houses did not have to overcome the same 
barriers to entry as hardware manufacturers.  As a result, mobilisation of this “societal” 
resource produced by the education system (Maurice, Silvestre, Sellier 1986, Lanciano, 
Maurice, Nohara, Silvestre 1998) has until now at least produced very positive effects. 
 
 
 
The divergent trajectories of the French computer and software 
industries 
 
The computer industry: a long process of decline  
 
 4
Given the domination of American computer makers in the 1960s, all European 
countries have at some point perceived the necessity to exercise some form of interventionism 
in the computer industry. French policy in this area, which was introduced in the mid 1960s, 
has been the most systematic. Essentially a reaction to the relationship of dependency with the 
Americans, it was constructed upon clearly interventionist concepts, resulting in an explicit 
industrial policy known as the "Plan-Calcul". This typical “mission-oriented” policy was 
triggered by the US administration's veto of France's purchase of a large computer necessary 
to the development of its nuclear programme. In response, President De Gaulle's government 
implemented a series of measures on industrial action plans, the organisation of R&D and the 
promotion of applications (Brulé 1997). 
Measures under the Plan-Calcul were implemented through contracts between the 
public and private sectors during two periods (1966-71 and 1971-75). On an industrial level, 
the Plan initially staked its success on the concentration of previously disparate forces. To this 
end, the CII (Compagnie Internationale pour l'Informatique) was formed in 1966 from the 
merger of the CE and the SEA. However, in spite of state financial support, the CII did not 
entirely succeed in achieving the objectives set out for it. After an unsuccessful attempt to 
create a European alliance with Siemens and Philips under the aegis of the UNIDATA project, 
the company was eventually merged with Honeywell-Bull, which was of French origin but 
controlled by American capital.  
This episode marked the end of the Plan-Calcul; the failure of the European project, 
followed by the transatlantic alliance, had reinforced France's technological dependency. State 
support for CII-HB continued, through a policy on public-sector purchasing and through a 
direct subsidy, until its nationalisation in 1981. Moreover, the French state attempted to 
relaunch the production of mini-computers through financial aid and subsidies to SEMS (a 
subsidiary of Thomson). 
These industrial policies were accompanied by scientific and administrative measures. 
In 1967, the Plan-Calcul created a powerful research organisation known as the IRIA 
(National Institute of Computer Science), renamed INRIA in 1979. Additionally, a State 
agency, “General IT Delegation”, was given responsibility for the promotion of IT 
applications. As of 1979, this role of diffusion of IT within French society was assumed by a 
specific entity, the “Agency for the Promotion of IT”. The characteristic feature of the French 
case, therefore, was the creation and existence of powerful institutional “levers” facilitating 
state intervention in all domains of IT; the problem was that the public powers failed to co-
ordinate these levers. 
The arrival of the Socialist government in 1981 further reinforced the State's influence 
on the IT sector, particularly through the nationalisation of the main firms. Under the 
“Electronics Sector” Action Plan, finalised in 1982, the state undertook a vast programme to 
restructure the electronics sector around  key centres of development within the public sector: 
Matra and Thomson in components, CGE in office applications and telecommunications, Bull 
in computers, Thomson in electronic consumer goods--including microcomputers--and Matra 
and CGE in industrial automation (Delapierre, Zimmerman 1991). 
After Bull absorbed the IT subsidiaries of Thomson and CGE within the framework of 
the Plan, the French computer sector became organised around three main players: IBM-
France, Hewlett Packard, which had been in Grenoble since the early 1970s, and the Bull 
group, which became the sole “national champion”.1 Bull was able to consolidate its 
                                                          
1
 Amongst them, IBM France, with two production sites (main servers and semiconductors), is devoted to the production 
function and plays no active role at the strategic level. By contrast, Hewlett Packard France has 2,530 employees, including 
both R&D engineers and the manufacturing workers for PCs; it has succeeded in coping with the computer paradigm shift, 
by moving rapidly towards RISC technology, Unix open systems and  the PC.  
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technological position through alliances around the Unix norm and its commercial position 
through its captive market in the French public administration. In 1987, Bull even embarked 
on the path of multinationalisation by buying the IT division of Honeywell, its former 
American owner, which had supplied it with technological knowledge before nationalisation. 
However, this expansion was hit by the global IT recession at the beginning of the 1990s. Bull 
suffered disproportionately because it remained a general producer centred on mainframe 
systems and neglected the rise of micro-computers. The 1990 take-over of an American 
specialist in this area, Zenith Data Systems, came too late to save Bull from a “historical” 
demise. Moreover, all French attempts to launch micro-computers ended in failure, in spite of 
high technological quality: Thomson Micro, Matra and Goupil all disappeared in this period 
of crisis. After experiencing large financial deficits, a restructuring through downsizing, and 
recapitalisation by the State--which incurred the wrath of the European Commission--Bull 
was partially privatised in 1995. The sole national actor, Bull now aims at being an integrator 
of technologies, progressively abandoning its own production of computers in favour of 
external supplies from its associates: Motorola or Intel for microprocessors, NEC for certain 
mainframes and IBM for Unix servers. 
 
Software industry: competitive edge despite an uncertain future 
 
While hardware providers have been weakened, the French software sector still shows 
a degree of competitiveness and can count on a certain degree of success. Indeed, the French 
IT industry displays a high supply capacity in the area of IT services and consultancy (Table 
I). Although marginalised in the production of computers and involved only in certain areas of 
software packages, France keeps a good performance in software services based around 
system integration and the development of applications.2 Its relative success, at least at 
European level, stems from the historical fact that the major players in this field took a key 
position in the implementation of  IT system within the firms. 
 
Table  1 Main players in software and IT services, 1997 
 
IT service specialists  
in Europe 
Turnover 
(millions of 
francs)           
World-wide software 
editors  
Turnover 
(millions of francs) 
IBM (US) 35.6 IBM (US) 69.3 
EDS (US) 21.3 Microsoft (US) 51.5 
Cap Gemini (Fr) 16.7 Fujitsu (J) 24.4 
Andersen Consulting 
(US) 
13.3 Computer Associates 
(US) 
15.8 
Siemens-NI (G) 12.9 Oracle (US) 12.5 
Debis S.H. (G) 10.4 NEC (J) 11.9 
Computer Sciences (US)   9.4 SAP (G)   9.2 
Sema Group (Fr/GB)   9.3 Hitachi (J)   6.9 
Bull (F)   9.2 Novell (US)   6.3 
Atos (F)   8.6 Digital (US)   6.3 
Source: Pierre Audoin Conseil 
 
Software and computer services firms have from the outset assumed the role of 
“consultants/strategists” in IT integration within the firms as much as that of software 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
2
 The French software industry is characterised by the great importance of IT services. Thus, there is a contrast between 
France, where services are dominant, and Germany, which clearly favours software packages and creates software editors 
such as SAP or Software AG etc. 
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application technicians in the narrow sense of the term, and which means that they thus 
occupy a strategic position in the installation of IT systems. This positioning of  software and 
computer services firms within  the IT  industry as a whole is inseparable from the historical 
context. At the moment that the “Plan-Calcul” was put into place, all IT producers were 
American, apart from the newly launched CII. Yet it was politically unthinkable to entrust 
American multinationals with the realisation of important works of IT engineering in the areas 
of defence, aerospace, telecommunications or finance. It was therefore necessary to create a 
national intermediary between the French administration and American manufacturers: the 
first  software and computer services firms, such as Sema, Cap Gemini or CGI, seized this 
opportunity, and many such French IT service companies, at least in the beginning, worked 
with a public client, a situation which both accounted for the majority of their turnover and 
also contributed to improving the quality of their technical expertise. 
In the 1980s, the considerable extension of application fields and the growing 
complexity of user needs generated a demand for IT solutions and software packages. A great 
number of new operators appeared in the software and applications sectors. On the one hand, 
large firms rapidly began to create subsidiary companies out of their own IT divisions. In 
particular, all the large banks hived off their IT divisions, thus creating large IT service 
companies. At the same time, the large electronics companies (CGE, Thomson, France 
Télécom, CEA, etc.) created networks of IT service subsidiaries. On the other hand, a 
breeding ground was created for new independent service companies, particularly during the 
1980s, with the rapid diffusion of micro-computers. In spite of a high failure rate, these small 
firms displayed dynamism and a capacity for adaptation. Even if they were sometimes termed 
temporary work agencies, hiring out IT personnel on a daily basis, a good number of such 
firms developed a more professional orientation, acquiring the know-how to offer "IT service 
packages".  
New “cutting-edge” software firms, created by the expansion of public-sector research 
centres, were also established in high-technology areas such as artificial intelligence, software 
tools, and so forth As we will see later, INRIA (National Institute of Computer Science), for 
example, has created forty-nine research-based start-ups 3since the beginning of the 1980s; 
these start-ups are run either by directly exploiting INRIA licences or prototypes, or by 
industrialising products in association with INRIA's own researchers. With this extremely 
diverse collection of IT service firms, France was able to build a level of IT competences 
which maintained its capacity for adaptation to an information society at a high level. 
Nevertheless, the French software industry was faced with a more difficult domestic 
and international competitive environment from the beginning of the 1990s onwards. 
Paralleling the global IT recession, this sector stagnated for the first time in its history. This 
crisis thus revealed a certain lack of compatibility between supply and cost structures of a 
number of French IT service companies, as well as the inadequacy of their industrial and 
marketing processes and even a failure to globalise their activities.  The IT services sector thus 
embarked on a process of industrial restructuring based on increased concentration and 
mergers (such as that between Sligos and Axime, creating Atos, the second largest IT service 
company behind Cap Gemini Sogeti) or take-overs (such as IBM's absorption of CGI and 
Axone). Apart from this search for economies of scale, another factor contributing to the 
restructuring of this industry was the entry of new types of companies: IT producers, 
telecommunications companies, software package editors, auditors and consultants. In 
particular, computer manufacturers themselves have played a considerable role in the changed 
environment: their interest in this sector derives both from a concern for keeping current 
                                                          
3
 INRIA is at the origin of 49 start-up companies, 36 of which are still actives under their own name and 13 of which have 
merged with other companies or stopped their activity 
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clients and from the margins available in the service sector, which contrast with diminishing 
returns on hardware. IBM and Bull have thus become major actors in the French IT services 
sector. 
This restructuring process seems linked to profound organisational changes within 
firms: some of these companies, which were until recently quasi-artisanal service firms, have 
entered a more industrial phase of production, necessitating both a standardisation of services 
and a formalisation of competences and investment procedures. These firms thus use strict 
methods of service development and build a common base of standardised products and 
services, offering catalogues with published tariffs, hence implying a promise of results. This 
more standardised type of production demands more solid financial foundations and a more 
rigorous selection of investment choices. These changes have gone hand in hand with greater 
specialisation and a considerable degree of internationalisation, since these are the only 
strategies which allow the imperative of return to investments to be achieved (Mowery 1996). 
 
The diverging dynamics of the hardware and software sectors  
 
As we have seen, although closely interwoven, the trajectories of the computer 
industry and the IT service industry have diverged in their paths of development. The former 
encountered a number of setbacks, while the latter managed to forge the international 
competitiveness in the period of paradigm shift. Possible explanations for this situation 
include the following:  
The “national champion” policy adopted for the computer industry was intended to 
concentrate limited resources on a single targeted firm. Such a monopolistic policy could thus 
be said to have hampered the entry of new firms capable of bringing new ideas or technologies 
into the sector, even if it did not completely eliminate it. Some companies were set up, but 
most of them ended in failure: the newly established firms were frequently absorbed by the 
“national champion”--on the initiative of the public authorities--with the aim of creating a 
“giant” able to compete with American multinationals. This phenomenon diminished the 
creative dynamic that should have led to the emergence of innovative industrial systems. No 
matter how desirable this policy was in political terms, it was impossible in the software 
sector, where the market is characterised by variety, segmentation and geographical 
dispersion. This sector, and in particular IT services, remains a competitive market, allowing 
revitalisation through the continual arrival of new start-ups. 
Bull, the sole “national champion”, still has its core competence in proprietary system 
architecture and a captive clientele that accounts for the greater part of its activities. This 
means that Bull was, at least until the  mid-1990s, a vertically integrated firm, engaged in all 
aspects of the production and marketing process, from microprocessor design to product sales. 
As the computer paradigm was shifting from closed to open systems in the 1980s, Bull had to 
operate radical changes in the organisational, technological and competitive domains. There 
were three factors which prevented it from making radical changes: strategically, Bull's 
national mission meant that the firm had to maintain a mainframe construction capacity in the 
national interest; institutionally, frequent government interventions based on political 
interests--because of Bull's State-owned status--impeded the maintaining of a constant 
orientation of organisational innovation; cognitively, Bull's bureaucratic organisation, 
reinforced by the appointment of public-sector technocrats (“state engineers”) as senior 
managers, was incapable of grasping the new technological trends. Such constraints did not 
exist for software firms, which were able to promote their own strategies whilst benefiting 
enormously from government orders or semi-public markets. Moreover, IT service firms  
remained open to new approaches or new solutions, not only because of their proximity to 
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customers’ needs, but also through the high mobility of their engineers. Finally, IT service 
firms were able to master a new approach to the management of creativity based on less 
hierarchical organization. 
In a sense, it might be said that such a divergence between the two sectors is the result 
of a “natural choice” of specialisation imposed by global competition. From our point of view, 
it shows also that such a choice is closely linked to the comparative advantages that the 
French economy has been able to derive from it specific national institutional arrangements. 
The national institutional frameworks in which firms are embedded are not neutral in this 
selection process. In this respect, the IT services sector is much better placed than the 
hardware sector to take advantage of resources produced by French institutions such as higher 
education, public research or technological districts. In the next section, we will take a closer 
look at the reality of interaction between the IT industry and the institutional environment in 
France.  
 
 
Institutional Creation of Resources for the French IT Industry 
 
The aim of this section is to examine concretely how the French system of innovation 
produces both professional actors and cognitive resources for the IT industry through its 
higher education system and public research programmes. Our main thesis is that the way in 
which these resources are generated cannot be dissociated from the French IT industry’s 
structure or its strategic behaviour. In other words, there is a  strong interdependence between 
the formation of resources and industrial capability, and the difference in sectoral 
performances results from the degree of strategic fitness within such interdependence (Sorge 
1991). 
 
The Higher Education System as a Producer of Human Resources 
 
Since the middle of the 1980s, the French higher education system has succeeded in 
increasing significantly the supply of IT professionals. It has proved capable, in co-operation 
with firms, of diversifying the IT training offered. The entire French economy has thus 
benefited from the production of increasingly well-trained IT professionals4 In particular, 
software and IT service companies  are able to attract a significant share of young engineers 
from the elite grandes écoles which select and train the best talent on the basis of mathematics 
and physics . This is an important factor in explaining the strength of French software and IT 
service companies. At the same time, however, it probably reflects the lower status of 
manufacturing industry in French society. 
 
 IT professions in the French economy 
 
According to the INSEE employment survey (1997) the total number of IT 
professional workers (engineers and programmers) is around 281,000. This figure can be 
broken down into 94,800 in software and IT services companies, 10,800 in computer 
manufacturers, 61,500 by users in the manufacturing sector, and 113,900 by users in the 
service sector. Computer manufacturers thus employ relatively few of these workers (only 3.9 
                                                          
4 A recent OECD report put the estimated shortages of IT professionals at 75,000 in Germany, 80,000 in the UK and 400,000 
in the USA  and a further 25,000 in France. It could be said that with a  strong emphasis on mathematics in its education 
system, France has a certain comparative advantage in terms of the production of human resources for the IT industry 
(OECD/STI 2000). 
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% in 1997): whilst such companies remain the largest employers of IT professionals within 
the manufacturing sector, their relative share has continuously diminished in the 1990s, whilst 
increasing numbers of such workers can be found in industries such as aeronautics or 
automobiles. By contrast, 40 percent of all IT workers are employed by service-sector users, 
including 10.3 percent in commerce, 6.4 percent in financial institutions and 6.8 percent in 
telecommunications. Naturally, however, software and IT services companies are the biggest 
employers, accounting for around a third of the total. Compared with other countries, France 
is characterised by the large number of IT professional workers in software services 
companies, or in other words, by the very importance of externalisation of software jobs.5 
 
Structure of the supply of computer professionals: the dominance of the engineering 
schools  
 
The training of computer professionals in France  clearly improved from the middle of 
the 1980s onwards. Thus, the annual flow of newly qualified computer scientists from the 
higher education system increased from 4,200 in 1982 to 10,200 in 1991 and reached 20,100 
in 1997, which means that the annual capacity of the higher education system to produce 
computer engineers increased fivefold over fifteen years. There has also been a dramatic 
increase in the number of students achieving qualifications at the Bac+4 standard or higher, a 
group which the different areas of the IT sector require as a priority. The comparison with the 
UK and Germany shows the very importance of such efforts: in 1996, the UK trained only 
6,000 computer scientists and 4,600 electronics engineers, 70 percent of whom had three years 
of university education. In the same year, Germany produced 6,600 IT graduates, half in 
universities (6 years or more) and 11,700 electronics engineers, 40 percent of whom were 
trained in universities. But Germany has recently seen the number of university graduates in 
electronics diminish. 
. The various initial training courses in computer science (hardware + software) are 
provided in the  various  tracks that make up the traditional French higher education system. 
 
Table 2.  Training Information technology in France (persons) 
 
 1991 1997 
Level of educational 
attainment 
Annual 
inflow 
Annual 
inflow 
Continuation rate 
of study 
Balance (Entry 
into the labour 
market) 
IUT administrative software course 
(BAC+2) 
 
IUT industrial software course 
(BAC+2) 
 
 
}3800 
2800 
 
 
2500 
60 - 65 % (1750) 
 
45 - 50 % (1200) 
 1050 
 
 
 1300 
BTS administrative software 
course( BAC+2) 
2000 2300 40  -50 % (1000)  1300 
First degree(BAC+3) 1500 1700 70 - 80 % (1300)    400 
Master's  (BAC+4) 1250 1400 45 - 50 %  (650)    750 
IUP/Miage (BAC+4/5)   800 1200 40 - 50 %  (550)    650 
DEA (BAC+5) 1050 1300 25 - 30 %  (350)    950 
DESS( BAC+5) 1300 1600           5 %  (100)  1500 
                                                          
5
 McKinsey reports that external software jobs represent 61 % of the total in France (relative to internal jobs), while they 
account for 52 % in Germany and 49 % in the United States (McKinsey report 1997)  
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PhD (BAC+8)   400   400 -    400 
Engineering schools with 
specialisation in computer science 
Engineering schools without 
specialisation in  computer science 
2100 2400 
 
 
2200 
          5 %  (100) 
 
 
           2 %  (50) 
 2300 
 
 
 2150 
  2500 -  2500 
Total  15250 
Source : Syntec-Informatique 
 
Note: the number of  years’ education after the BAC (Baccalaureate) corresponds to the level of exit 
from the higher education system. 
 
The first track consists of short courses at the Bac+2 level (DUT or BTS). Such 
qualifications are considered vocational and directly focused on the labour market; they attract 
numerous students who are  seeking a rapid entry to the labour market. The Bac+2 diploma 
qualifies students as programmers or IT technicians but limits them to a certain range of jobs; 
although it does not prevent them from reaching higher status jobs in the course of their 
careers, it does tend to restrict them to the technical tasks of programming or maintenance and 
makes progress beyond the lowest ranks of management difficult.  
 
The second track consists of the longer university courses required to qualify for 
professions at all levels of the IT industry. This track, which accounts for one third of total 
annual flows of computer specialists, includes several pathways that have different aims. 
- The first of these pathways is the most traditional, with diplomas ranging from 
degrees in IT to doctorates, via masters’ degrees and the DEA (post-graduate diploma). This 
route, culminating in around four hundred doctoral theses per year, has the function of 
creating a reserve of IT researchers, for both higher education and publicly funded research. 
France has a significant intellectual force of more than 3000 IT researchers in different public 
organisations such as the CNRS (National Centre for Scientific Research), INRIA and CEA 
(Centre for Nuclear Research), and 4300 professors/lecturer-researchers in universities. 
- After a master’s degree, it is also possible to follow a more vocational programme of 
study, the DESS (one-year postgraduate diploma in an applied subject), which affords direct 
access to managerial status. This Bac+5 diploma is a relatively recent development, often 
jointly organised by universities and firms. The fact that these programmes are designed in 
association with practitioners gives them a reputation for meeting the needs of firms. The third  
track is the engineering schools, the grandes écoles, which constitute the French elite model 
par excellence. Unlike the university system that is open to all those who have obtained the 
baccalauréat, these schools set the entrance examinations and select a small number of 
students. France has 200 such institutions, producing a total of 24,000 graduate engineers per 
year. While all the grandes écoles offer IT training, only around thirty are generally 
considered to be "IT schools". The ability to recruit highly qualified engineers is one of the 
strengths of the French IT industry, particularly in the service sector. The large software and 
computer services companies alone attract between a quarter and a third of newly qualified 
engineers (6,000-8,000 out of 24,000), depending on the state of the labour market. Such 
firms tend to recruit engineering graduates regardless of specialisation and tend to offer a 
further three to six months’ training depending on the type of programming languages used by 
the company.  
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R&D levels in the IT industry 
 
The IT manufacturing industry (comprised of 70 computer and office equipment 
manufacturers) spends 3.35 billion francs on R&D, or 4.7 percent of the turnover of the 
sector, and employs 3,258 researchers, which represents 9.7 percent of its workforce. The 526 
firms in the software and IT service industry spend 2.92 billion francs per year, or 9.9 percent 
of turnover, on R&D; 10 percent of the workforce, some 3,801 employees, are researchers. 
The IT manufacturing industry and the software and IT service industry account for 2.5 and 
2.1 percent, respectively, of total national R&D expenditure, and 4.9 and 5.7 percent, 
respectively, of the total number of researchers employed (Table III). 
 
Table 3 Characteristics of R/D activities in IT industry: 1995 
 
 Computer 
industry  
software 
industry 
All sectors (private 
sector) 
Number of firms 
concerned by R/D 
70 526 4684 
Total number of 
employees 
33662 37208 2533286 
Turnover (in millions 
of French francs) 
71896 29488 2762531 
Number of R/D 
researchers/engineers 
3258 3801 66618 
Total expenditure of 
R/D (in millions of French 
francs) 
3353 2916 136443 
Of which public 
financing 
595   
 (18 %) 
  124 
 (4 %) 
15396 
 (11 %) 
R/D Domains      (100%)        (100 %) (100 %) 
Basic Research     0.4 %   0.5 %   4.2 % 
Applied Research    8.0 % 15.8 % 25.5 % 
Development 91.6 % 83.7 % 70.3 % 
Source : Ministry of Technology and Research: Research and Development,  Results 1995. 
 
In fact, research expenditure in the IT manufacturing sector is not particularly high in 
relation to national averages. The 4.7 percent of turnover spent on R&D is slightly below the 
national manufacturing industry average of 4.9 percent and is well behind that in the 
aerospace, pharmaceutical or automobile industries.6 This is so in spite of significant 
contributions from the State, which contributes 595 million francs out of a total of 3.35 billion 
francs of such expenditure, or 17.7 percent. Part of R&D expenditure tends to be externalised 
or sub-contracted, with 13 percent of expenditure taking place outside the firms themselves, 
probably in the form of contracts with the higher education sector or public-sector research 
organisations. Also, the level of R&D expenditure has stagnated in the last decade, signalling 
a downward trend in R&D investment: the proportion of turnover spent on research fell from 
5.7 percent in 1986 to 4.7 percent in 1995. This lack of dynamism reflects both the decline of 
French producers, particularly Bull, and the fact that R&D activity has been displaced both 
upstream (to semiconductors) and downstream (to software). 
                                                          
6
 This R&D expenditure in France is much lower (17-30 %) than in Germany and UK: Source:  STAN 1994 
(OECD). 
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Meanwhile, the IT service sector has increasingly become a major consumer of R&D 
activities. After being largely absent from the domain of R&D in the 1970s and 1980s, this 
sector has made a considerable breakthrough in this area since the end of the 1980s. The 
increased importance of R&D activities is due to several factors. First, European projects such 
as Eureka and Esprit, in which several French software and IT service companies have been 
active participants (e.g. the “Software Factory”), have revealed the importance of R&D in this 
sector. Second, computer manufacturers have gradually become service companies and have 
devoted more of their R&D capacity to software. Finally, software and IT service companies 
have tended, as we have already seen, to concentrate on producing software packages and to 
industrialise their products, which has led to an increase in development activities. 
 
Training of the key actors in innovation 
 
More generally, it is important to emphasise the social and professional role of these 
“graduate engineers” in France. Compared with the Anglo-Saxon countries and Japan, where 
the engineer status is not controlled at all, the French state organises the training of engineers, 
evaluates the engineering schools and controls access to qualified engineer status. The 
engineering degree awarded by these schools gives these graduate engineers a social and 
professional legitimacy that immediately grants them access to the position of cadre or 
manager, which is regarded as an integral part of company management. Protected by law and 
recognised by the collective agreement, the emblematic figure of the graduate engineer in 
France is highly legitimated (Lanciano, Nohara et Verdier 1998).  
The French education system deliberately sets out to create a very high level of 
educational and professional stratification linked to the qualifications pyramid. This multi-
layered system is based not only on the varying lengths of time required to obtain the different 
qualifications but also on institutional duality, such as that created by the distinction between 
the universities and the grandes écoles. Thus the major engineering schools, elitist institutions 
at the top of the academic hierarchy, provide instruction based on academic disciplines and 
mathematics-based training and produce engineers who are technically “generalists”, even 
though the schools themselves specialise to a greater or lesser extent in certain technological 
fields (telecommunications, aeronautics, civil engineering, etc.).  The most academically able 
graduates of these grandes écoles gravitate towards the state bureaucracy (i.e., the various 
branches of the civil service), which is engaged not only in industrial policy but also in large-
scale scientific programmes.  
This situation produces close links with industrial firms, which are often managed by 
graduate engineers. Such close links, cemented by the mobility of graduate engineers between 
the public and private sectors, tend to promote the “mission-oriented” technology policy, 
which is a strong state-led action, rather than the “diffusion-oriented” policy backed up by 
intermediate organisations such as local governments, professional associations and so on 
(Callon and Foray 1997). The “mission-oriented” policy can result in massive failure (Plan-
Calcul or the Machine Tool Plan) as a result of excessive bureaucratic intervention, but also in 
occasional successes or even a far-reaching scientific "prowess", particularly when the state 
acts as co-ordinator. This phenomenon is noticeable in certain sectors such as the nuclear, 
aerospace and telecommunications industries, where the technocracy composed of "state 
engineers" co-ordinates and supports a "major national project" (Ziegler 1997).7  
                                                          
7
 This author provides an in-depth analysis of the way that differences in the forms of socialisation of engineers between 
France and Germany create the divergences on public industrial policy in the two countries. The existence of “state 
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Higher education and R&D institutions as cognitive resources for innovation 
 
The IT industry is based on a range of so-called “generic” technologies, namely 
materials technologies, signal processing, telecommunications and transmission technologies.  
The design and development of all IT products is based on these technologies and applied 
mathematics. Thus, the entire industry is dependent on a shared reservoir of technological 
knowledge. 
This technological basis does not, however, form a homogenous discipline. Rather, it 
is constituted through the association of a multiplicity of different forms of knowledge 
produced in a number of disciplines. Thus, R&D activities depend on bringing together 
competences and knowledge that have developed relatively independently of each other. New 
products are often created by linking pre-existing technologies (Nelson and Winter 1982). 
Here, innovation mainly consists of combining already known elements in an original way, 
thus creating new applications in new areas. 
Historically, France has tended to develop large-scale scientific programmes managed 
by the state in various technological spheres. As we indicated above, the state-led scientific 
programmes are profoundly shaped by the way in which the state technocracy is composed of  
engineers employed by the various branches of the civil service. The development of what we 
might term “technological districts” also bears the mark of this history, to the extent that they 
have often been constructed through the establishment of public research institutes, 
engineering schools and public-sector companies in specific locations. As far as IT is 
concerned, the Plan-Calcul and the development programme for the electronics industry have 
played an important role in the emergence of technological districts which continue to act as a 
catalyst for co-operation between industry and research: at certain sites, close collaboration 
takes place between higher education, public research institutions and companies. However, 
the logic of a large-scale, state-led scientific programme has been shown to have financial, 
political and strategic limits. While remaining located in local high-tech areas, IT firms have 
been forced to strengthen and, above all, reconfigure their collaborative networks beyond 
national frontiers. 
 
Development of local co-operative relationships between industry and research 
  
Given the importance of the French state’s role in the promotion of electronic and 
information technologies, the development of co-operation between industry and research 
cannot be examined without taking into account public policies, which have been 
characterised by the pursuit of “technological excellence”, often in the name of national 
sovereignty. As the case of the Plan-Calcul illustrates, major scientific and industrial 
programmes have been implemented by public establishments with a large degree of financial 
autonomy. Centralisation of technological innovation has gone hand in hand with a 
preoccupation with national and regional development, which has led the State to intervene by 
making financial contributions to regional economic development and installing scientific and 
technical infrastructures. As far as the IT industry in particular is concerned, the Plan-Calcul 
and the various national programmes designed to boost the electronics industry have 
contributed to the development of certain regional technological centres, first of all through 
the choices made in the location of public-sector research establishments (CNRS, INRIA, 
etc.), second, through the expansion of the engineering  schools and finally through the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
engineers” in France and their absence in Germany seem to explain the “mission-oriented” policy in the former case and  the 
“diffusion-oriented” policy in the latter case. 
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establishment of research facilities by public and private companies with high scientific 
potential (CEA, the atomic agency, CNET – in telecommunications etc.). This has led to the 
development of an infrastructure on which local co-operative networks can be based, although 
the precise form of development has differed from one centre to another. The system of co-
operation between industry and research in the French IT industry thus remains largely 
modelled on a past policy of large-scale scientific programmes. It may be noted that the Esprit 
series of European programmes had no effect on existing co-operative networks and did not 
replace them with new arrangements. Naturally, the Esprit projects in which Bull and 
Thomson, as well as many software and IT service companies and research institutions such 
as INRIA and university teams, were active participants, allowed research networks to be 
extended on a European scale and brought the various players in the European IT industry 
closer together. From the French perspective, however, the constitution of European networks 
has taken place within existing local and co-operative arrangements, notably those focused 
around regional centres. Being established in a locality does not, therefore, seem to conflict 
with the extension of co-operation between the industry, universities and public research to 
the European scale.  
Apart from the Greater Paris region (Ile-de-France), which accounts for half the 
national R&D capacity, there are four other dynamic regional centres for electronic 
technologies with a high IT component.8 
 
Grenoble region: By far the most important centre outside Paris is the Grenoble 
region. Often dubbed the French “Silicon Valley”, this area occupies first place in the 
European league table for micro-electronic research. In particular, the semi-conductor industry 
benefits from synergies based on a close link between research and production. This region 
accounts for 10 percent of national expenditure on R&D in electronics and it employs 600 
researchers, 1,900 engineers and 500 designers of integrated circuits in semiconductor 
industry (Usine nouvelle 1997). The region has a strong university tradition, which acts as a 
catalyst for co-operation between public-sector research establishments and engineering 
schools and companies, including both large groups (Bull, Hewlett-Packard, Thomson, Cap-
Gemini etc.) and small and medium-sized firms such as Soitec (start-up from CEA), which 
commercialises the silicon surface treatment  technology, Jay Electronique, which is engaged 
in optoelectronics, Robobat, which produces software packages  for structural calculation and 
Polyspace (an INRIA spin-off), which develops software validation tools. 
 
Toulouse: The second centre is constituted around Motorola and IT firms linked to the 
aerospace/space industry in the Toulouse region. This concentration was explicitly created 
through national policies in aerospace, space sciences and electronics, namely the 
decentralisation of the CNES (National Centre for Space Science), the location of Airbus-
Industrie and the arrival of Motorola within the framework of the Plan-Calcul. This is the 
location of one of Motorola's semi-conductor production plants, as well as a research centre in 
power integrated circuits which it runs in conjunction with the CNRS. In addition, the 
aeronautic and space industries are both major consumers of electronic technologies and 
attract industrial electronics companies such as Thomson and Matra Datasystems, as well as 
sustaining numerous software companies. This productive infrastructure is fed by flows of 
engineers trained by engineering schools such as the Ecole Nationale Supérieure de 
l'Aéronautique as well as scientific universities. 
                                                          
8
 In terms of scientific/technological activities (academic publications and patents application), Paris is ranked as 
the most active region in Europe, Grenoble at 31st place and Toulouse at 56th place. Source,: Science and 
Technology 2000, OST. 
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Brittany: The third centre, in the Brittany region, is organised around digital 
telecommunications technology (IT, telecommunications and networks). This region has 
several engineering schools and universities specialising in telecommunications (Ecole 
Nationale Supérieure de Télécommunication etc.), from which 600 engineers, 950 higher-
level technicians and 250 Bac+5 level university students graduate annually. This area attracts 
numerous small and medium-sized high-technology enterprises (Ipsis, Sacet in  mobile 
telephony, Cr2a-di, Odaxys in  network architecture and Ystel.com or Isocèle in  multimedia 
products/services etc.) and large corporations such as Alcatel, ATT, Matra, Canon and 
Thomson multimedia, as well as 4,000 researchers in public-sector institutions such as CNET 
(National Centre of Telecommunications Research) and INRIA. In all, 40 percent of French 
research in telecommunications is concentrated in the Brittany region. 
 
Sophia-Antipolis: The fourth centre, Sophia-Antipolis, in the Nice region, was one of 
the first prototypes of the now-familiar science park (Longhi 1999). Built in a region with no 
industrial tradition in the 1970s, its aim, from the outset, was to bring together R&D activities 
by encouraging  strategic partnerships between public research  laboratories and corporate 
laboratories. It is currently home to 1100 firms of which 25 % belong to the IT sector, mostly 
small and medium-sized technological or research firms, employing more than 2,000 IT 
engineers and researchers. Although this centre is not exclusively devoted to electronic 
activities, the sector is well represented by public establishments such as the Ecole de Mines, 
University of Nice and  CNRS, INRIA labs with 1400 students in computer science or 
telecommunication, as well as research centres belonging to multinational groups such as 
Nortel networks, SAP, Lucent technologies, or Compaq. This district is also characterised by 
the  presence of academic spin-offs from the public institutions. In the 1980s, for example, 
INRIA-Sophia  set up  some of the first spin-offs, such as Simulog or Ilog in the fields of 
computer modelling and continues to  establish  small high-technology companies such as 
Istar in the field of digital mapping databases, Realviz in computer vision, Focus Imaging in  
computer-aided medical analysis, Activanet in  internet services and so on. 
 
R&D co-operation in the Grenoble region 
 
If all the various aspects of its intellectual activities are taken into account--the number 
of researchers employed, the concentration of higher education institutions and research 
laboratories, and the number of innovative firms--Grenoble can very properly be described as 
a “technological district” in the generally accepted sense of the term (Bernardy de Sigoyer and 
Boisgontier 1988, Salais and Storper 1997). 
This region has a long tradition of co-operation between industry and higher education 
in innovation networks, which emerged in the electrical engineering industry in the 1930s. 
The exchange of know-how and local synergies was maintained in the electro-chemical 
industry until the advent of the micro-electronic industry in the 1970s. It is undeniable that the 
Grenoble region had already hosted co-operation between local productive actors which 
would justify the title of "technological district", or local innovation system.  It was against 
this background that IT emerged from the 1970s onwards, and the infrastructure was renewed 
around a few dominant establishments such as CNET, LETI (Laboratory of Microelectronics) 
and Thomson-CSF in the area of semi-conductors, and INRIA, Bull, Hewlett-Packard and 
XEROX in the IT sphere. At the same time, a large number of small high-tech companies 
were created, principally as a result of the decentralisation of research centres. 
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The Grenoble region therefore constitutes an interesting case of an IT industrial 
district. For our purposes, however, we will try to describe, by way of illustration, the 
institutional landscape in Grenoble, and its multiple networks of co-operation between 
industry and higher education. 
With regard to higher education, the region has a scientific university and the INPG 
(National Polytechnic Institute of Grenoble), which is a public federation of nine engineering 
schools, over thirty research institutes and a doctoral programme. This federal structure 
accommodates a total of three thousand engineering science students, producing some three 
hundred doctoral theses per year. In particular, ENSIMAG (Higher National School of IT and 
Applied Mathematics), a pioneer in IT education, plays a central role in the specialised 
education of computer scientists (500 students), with symbiotic links between education and 
research involving the IMAG (Grenoble Institute of IT and Applied Maths) institution. With 
regard to IT research, there are seven research institutes situated on the university campus 
under the IMAG label and jointly administered by the CNRS, INPG and the Scientific 
University of Grenoble. IMAG combines the functions of scientific research, teaching in the 
engineering school and university and the supervision of doctoral students. Its seven institutes 
vary in size, containing between thirty and one hundred staff members; each brings together 
several teams working on concrete topics such as multimedia systems, real-time 
programming, parallel calculation, computer assisted translation, and so on. The federal 
structure allows teams to share resources (IT resources, media library, management, etc.), to 
participate in decision making and to deal more effectively with external partners. Most of 
these institutes work at the interface between theoretical and applied fields, and have contacts 
not only with other public research establishments (CNET, INRIA) and foreign universities, 
but also with firms. With these different partners, they are capable of developing co-operative 
networks over time. Collaboration with enterprises ranges from sub-contracting to the joint 
development of software packages and supervision of doctoral theses (through jointly funded 
scholarships), and so on. 
With regard to public-sector research, INRIA has a research institute in Grenoble with 
some 230 people. INRIA, one of the smallest public  research institutions with 715 permanent 
posts9, is charged with the tasks of developing a centre of scientific excellence in the area of 
IT, identifying future IT needs and rapidly diffusing its scientific results in partnership with 
companies. To these ends, it has five research establishments across France, and a budget (in 
1997) of 495 billion francs, of which 81 billion, or around a sixth, consist of 360 contracts 
with external partners. These are predominantly industrial contracts with companies (40%) 
and European contracts in the Esprit framework (one-third). It  has a workforce of some 2,100 
people, of which 1,700 are scientists (715 permanent posts, 550 doctoral students/researchers, 
650 foreign visitors, and 400 external collaborators from industry or higher education). Unlike 
the other public research institutions, it has historically supported the policy of academic spin-
offs; in 2000, thirty-six start-ups  generated a combined turnover of 800 billion francs and had 
1400 employees, either by directly exploiting INRIA licences or prototypes, or by 
industrialising products in association with INRIA's own researchers. Additionally, the 
institution has just created a subsidiary, “INRIA-Transfert”, a consultancy which aims to 
support the foundation of new IT companies and also “I-Source”, which is the first  venture –
capital fund dedicated to IT start-ups. 
The Grenoble institute has 230 researchers, of which around 100 are doctoral students 
working on the joint projects with the IMAG Institute mentioned above. In 1997, the Institute 
was working on nine projects, mostly with external partners, in the following areas: 
                                                          
9
 Compared with CNRS (26200 permanent posts), CEA (atomic agency; 11500 permanent posts), CNET (4500 permanent 
posts) etc., INRIA is the smallest public laboratory among the French scientific institutions. 
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- Communications IT (networks, Internet, systems and applications). Projects in this 
area involve a significant degree of partnership with firms such as Bull, Rank Xerox, SGS-
Thomson, Aerospatiale, Hewlett-Packard, and others. 
- Intelligent machines (digital imaging, intelligent vehicles). These involve strong 
collaborative relationships with EDF (Electricité de France), Renault, CNET, and others. 
- Parallel calculation (basic software and intensive calculation). These involve 
partnerships with software and IT service companies such as Simulog and Matra Cap 
Systèmes. 
Despite all these projects, the Institute has only 70 of its own researchers, who work 
with around 100 doctoral researchers and around 60 outside partners.  It is thus heavily 
dependent on external resources supplied by the local infrastructure. It co-operates strongly 
with Bull (which has a research centre in Grenoble) in a “grouping of economic interest” 
which jointly manages four programmes. Through this relationship, the Institute is permanent 
host to around ten Bull engineers. This partnership is, in great part, the inheritance of long-
established collaboration between Bull’s scientific department and the local scientific 
community (particularly IMAG). INRIA has increasingly become the main catalyst in the 
process of turning scientific findings into concrete applications. 
This brief outline of the situation in Grenoble should only be seen as an illustration 
and has no pretensions to being representative at the national level. However, it provides us 
with deep insights into certain aspects of the dynamic of innovation  in France. 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
 Firms’ competitiveness  does not depend solely on their strategies and actions.  It is 
fundamentally related to the quality of the societal space  of which they are a part, which  
brings into play industrial policies, academic-industrial research links and the quality of higher 
education. From this point of view, the strength of the American IT industry does not seem to 
rest simply on the innovative capacity of its large firms such as IBM, Sun Microsystem or 
Intel. Indeed, its power seems to rely more on the dynamic engendered by new entrants than 
the well-established big firms. New firms are constantly being created  to undertake 
innovative projects; they rely on the mobility of engineers (spin-offs) and often takes 
advantage of the opportunities offered by venture capital funds. This  start-up dynamic,  based 
on capacities for innovation and collective learning, seems to be an essential engine  in the 
transformation of the IT industry in the US (Saxenian 1998). 
Given the overwhelming force of the American IT industry, including in terms of 
software packages and IT services, Europe certainly seems to suffer from structural 
deficiencies inherited from past “national champion” policies (Paulré 1997). Despite these 
weaknesses, some European countries seem to be showing their capacity to resist the 
American offensive, drawing on knowledge, competences or positions linked to their own 
institutional set-ups. In particular, the case of France, which in the past systematically 
developed state policies in favour of IT, shows us how  actors in the innovation process rely 
on existing institutions to revitalise their innovation activities. 
The French IT industry,  like those of most other European countries, has come under 
intense technological competition from the US. The industry’s supply structure is dominated 
by the presence of American firms within France, both in the production of computers and the 
editing of software packages. French strengths can be found in IT services based around 
system integration and the development of applications. Indeed, French software houses are 
managing to resist the American pressure not only with their captive market (an important 
public sector), but also with their quality of service based on cognitive and local proximity to 
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their clients. They are thus able to accumulate specific competences linked to their particular 
environments: for example, certain French software houses excel in scientific calculation or 
production of state-of-the-art software, because of their proximity to the aerospace and nuclear 
industries. Moreover, as in the majority of knowledge-intensive services, the user-producer 
relationship is of fundamental importance in the IT sector, since the development of software 
requires a sort of co-production between computer engineers and clients. This is a prime 
example of a sector where the clients intervene directly in the production of services, hence 
the importance of the quality of interaction between producers and users, emphasised by 
Lundvall (1988). In this way, the competences accumulated in the sector of application 
services seem to reflect the structure of the national economy, or more precisely, the 
international specialisation of a country. From this point of view, the proximity between IT 
services and telecommunications network, a sector protected by the state until recently in all 
European countries, may create important opportunities to promote local development 
synergy.  
The French IT industry is supported by two institutional arrangements established 
during the period of “mission-oriented policies”, which are now universally criticised  by 
technical and scientific experts as a political error. Paradoxically, these arrangements 
contribute  to  the production of the most important intangible resources for the IT sector, 
even if its contribution to the industrial success is difficult to estimate in quantitative terms. 
One of the resources of these IT firms would seem to be the quality of engineer training. The 
sector is highly dependent upon the quality of its human resources, as is the case with the 
majority of services based on high-level technical knowledge. Indeed, the French higher 
education system has been able to increase its supply of computer engineers without 
compromising the quality of its training. Although it is far from satisfying all demands, 
particularly with regard to continuing training, it has proved capable, in co-operation with 
firms, of diversifying the training offered. The entire French economy has thus benefited from 
the production of increasingly well-trained IT professionals.  
But what is most evident is that French computer engineering services firms cream off 
a significant share of newly qualified engineers from the grandes écoles, who constitute the 
most socially legitimated supply of human resources. The mutual attraction established 
between these firms and the “best engineers” is certainly one of the strengths of the French IT 
services sector. 
In addition to the supply of high-level human resources, a not insignificant part of the 
IT sector benefits from the diffuse effects, integrated into an innovative “milieu” (Gaffard 
1990), of the major scientific programmes that France has historically developed. The 
development of "technological districts" also bears the mark of this history, to the extent that 
they have often been constructed through the establishment of public research institutes, 
engineering schools and public-sector companies in specific locations. As far as IT is 
concerned, several local technological districts constitute high-level centres for electronics 
and IT and continue to act as  catalysts  in promoting co-operation between industry and 
research. At certain sites, close collaboration takes place between higher education, public 
research institutions and companies, in order to create  potential new resources and 
knowledge. In contrast to the US, however, these French districts do not fully succeed in 
stimulating the mobility of researchers between public sectors and firms or the launching of 
start-ups –except in the rare case of INRIA-, probably because of several societal elements 
such as the protected status of public researchers or university professors10, a scarcity of 
venture capital or a lack of entrepreneurship. The new French legislation on innovation, 
                                                          
10
 They gain  tenure at an earlier stage of their academic careers – in their late  twenties or  early thirties - if they pass the  
competitive examination. 
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promulgated in 1999, may well help to promote a new entrepreneurial spirit by eliminating 
such societal inertia.  
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